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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
ILLEGITIMATE SUCCESSION-ILLINOIS STATUTE DENYING THE
RIGHTS OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN TO INHERIT FROM FATHER'S

ESTATES IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Trimble v. Gordon, 97 S. Ct.

1459 (1977).

Under common law, illegitimate children had the legal status of
nullius filius,' the child of no one. Certain states have abolished the
illegitimate classification,2 while others have relaxed the inflexible
common law rule.3 The Supreme Court had refrained from dealing
with statutes containing illegitimate classifications until 1968. The
first applications of the equal protection clause in this area came with
the landmark decisions of Levy v. Louisiana4 and Glona v. American
GuaranteeandLiability InsuranceCo.5

Since 1968, the Court has addressed the question of illegitimate
1. See, W. BLAcr TONE, CoMMENTAmrES 459 (Cooley 3d ed. 1884); H. CLARK,
LAw OF DOMESnc RELATIONS 155-58 (1968); Note, 47 NoTRE DAME LAW. 392 at
394-95 (1971) [hereinafter cited as ConstitutionalLaw and Equal Protection].
2. E.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-09 (Supp. 1977); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.060
(Supp. 1975-76).
3. For a survey of state laws on inheritance rights of illegitimates, see Constitutional
Law and Equal Protection,supra note 1, at 398.
4. 391 U.S. 68 (1968). See also Gray & Rudovsky, The Court Acknowledges the
Illegitimate: Levy v. Louisiana and Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance
Co., 118 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1969); Krause, Legitimate and Illegitimate Offspring of
Levy v. Louisiana-FirstDecisions on Equal Protection and Paternity, 36 U. Cm. L.
REv. 338 (1969).
5. 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
6. Trimble v. Gordon, 97 S. Ct. 1459 (1977) (intestate succession); Mathews v.
Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976) (Social Security benefits); Beaty v. Weinberger, 418 F.2d
300 (5th Cir. 1973), summarily af 'd, 418 U.S. 901 (1974) (Social Security benefits);
Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974) (Social Security benefits); New Jersey
Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973) (welfare assistance);
Griffin v. Richardson, 346 F. Supp. 1226 (D. Md. 1972), summarily aff'd, 409 U.S.
1069 (1972) (Social Security benefits); Davis v. Richardson, 342 F. Supp. 588 (D.
Conn. 1972), aff'd, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972) (Social Security benefits); Gomez v. Perez,
409 U.S. 535 (1973) (right to parental support); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
406 U.S. 164 (1972) (workmens compensation benefits); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S.
532 (1971) (intestate succession); Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391
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classifications on a dozen occasions."

Prior to Trimble v. Gordon,7

the trend was to strike down statutes that discriminated against illegitimate children. The major exception to that trend was Labine v. Vincent, 8 where Louisiana's intestate succession statute was upheld, even
though it directly excluded illegitimate children.
The confusing factor present in the Supreme Court's treatment of
the illegitimacy controversy has been the inconsistent application of
equal protection tests.9 The Court has vacillated between the different
approaches for over a decade, but no classification of illegitimate
children has been held to constitute a suspect class requiring strict
scrutiny. 10 In Labine, Justice Black noted that the power to dispose
of the property of a person dying intestate resided with the individual
states," and the statute there before the Court was given a minimum
of scrutiny.' 2 Other cases dealing with the issue have applied a more
exacting standard in their equal protection analysis.' 3 The Illinois Supreme Court set the stage perfectly because of their total reliance on
Labine. In Trimble, Justice Powell was forced to apply something
more than minimum scrutiny to find an equal protection violation.' 4
U.S. 73 (1968) (parents' claim for wrongful death of child); Levy v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 68 (1968) (child's claim for wrongful death of mother).
7. 97 S. Ct. 1459 (1977).
8. 401 U.S. 532 (1971). See generally, Petrillo, Labine v. Vincent: Illegitimates,
Inheritance, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 75 DIcx. L. Rnv. 377 (1971); Note,
Labine v. Vincent: Louisiana Denies Intestate Succession Rights to Illegitimates, 38
BROOKLYN L. REv. 428 (1971).
9. See, e.g., Note, Illegitimacy and Equal Protection Two Tiers or an Analytical
Grab-Bag?, 7 Loy. Cm. L.J. 754 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Illegitimacy and Equal
Protection].
10. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976).
11. 401 U.S. at 538.
12. Justice Black admitted: "It may be possible that some of these choices are
more 'rational' than the choices inherent in Louisiana's categories of illegitimates."
Id.
13. "Mhe scrutiny by which their showing is to be judged is not a toothless
one . . . ." Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (citing Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417
U.S. 628 (1974); Frontiero v. Richardson 411 U.S. at 691 (1973)). For commentary
about the possibility that the two tier analysis system has been eclipsed, see Illegitimacy
and Equal Protection,supra note 9, at 759-67.
14. In an interesting footnote, Justice Powell compared the statutes of the two
states, and finally admitted that a different standard of equal protection had been
applied in Trimble v. Gordon, 97 S. Ct. 1459 (1977):
The Illinois statute can be distinguished in several respects from the
Louisiana statute in Labine. The discrimination in Labine took a different
form, suggesting different legislative objectives. . . . In its impact on the
illegitimate children excluded from their parents' estates, the statute was
significantly different. Under Louisiana law, all illegitimate children, "natural"
and "bastard," were entitled to support from the estate of the deceased parent. . . . Despite these differences, it is apparent that we have examined
the Illinois statute more critically than the Court examined the Louisiana statute

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol13/iss1/12

2

Chaffee: Illegitimate Succession--Illinois Statute Denying the Rights of I

TULSA LAW JOURNAL

(Vol. 13.178

Illinois maintained a descent and distribution statute denying
illegitimate children the right to inherit from their natural fathers. 1r

The plaintiff, an illegitimate daughter, challenged the statute claiming
the right to inherit from her deceased natural father.'; The Supreme
Court of Illinois denied the claim 17 and upheld the validity of the

statute. In Trimble, the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the plaintiff was entitled to inherit from her natural father
and that the Illinois statute was a violation of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The Labine and Trimble cases have many factual similarities.
In each case, the purported father had been lawfully determined to be
the parent.'" Both the Louisiana and Illinois statutes required the fathers
to formally legitimize their illegitimate children. 19 Because of these
factual similarities, the Illinois Supreme Court had denied the plaintiff's
claim. 0 What Illinois did not foresee was an apparent change of
in Labine. To the extent that our analysis in this case differs from that in
Labine the more recent analysis controls.
97 S. Ct. at 1468 n.17 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
15. ILL. RFV. STAT. ch. 3, § 12 (1961) provides:
An illegitimate child is heir of its mother and of any maternal ancestor,
and of any person from whom its mother might have inherited, if living; and
the lawful issue of an illegitimate person shall represent such person and take,
by descent, any estate which the parent would have taken, if living. An
illegitimate child whose parents intermarry and who is acknowledged by the
father as the father's child shall be considered legitimate.
The statute was revised in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 2-2 (Supp. 1976-77) with no
major changes.
16. Sherman Gordon was determined to be the natural father of the plaintiff, Deta
Mona Trimble, in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois. The court entered
a paternity order against Gordon requiring the payment of $15 per week for the
support of the plaintiff. Trimble v. Gordon, 97 S. Ct. 1459, 1462 (1977).
17. The Illinois Supreme Court had dealt with Respondant Trimble's claim sub
nom. In Re Estate of Karras, 61 Ill. 2d 40, 329 N.E.2d 234 (1975). Karras was a
consolidation of two separate cases dealing with similar fact situations. Plaintiff
Trimble was allowed to file an amicus curiae brief.
18. In Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971), the father, Ezra Vincent, had
executed a form acknowledgment before the Louisiana State Board of Health. The
form contained the specific admission that Vincent was the natural father of his
illegitimate daughter, Rita Vincent. In Trimble v. Gordon, 97 S. Ct. 1459 (1977),
the father was judicially designated in a paternity proceeding. See note 16, supra and
accompanying text.
19. Louisiana required a formal legitimazation or adoption, Labine v. Vincent,
401 U.S. 532, 534 (1971). Illinois required that the parents have intermarried and
that the father have acknowledged the illegitimate child. See note 15, supra and
accompanying text.
20. However, it is interesting to note that the Supreme Court of Ohio distinguished
Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971), and reached the same result as Trimble v.
Gordon, 97 S. Ct. 1459 (1977), in Green v. Woodard, 40 Ohio App. 2d 101, 318
N.E.2d 397 (1974); See, Note, 44 U. CINN. L. REv. 415 (1975).
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heart by the Supreme Court since Labine.21
In Trimble, the Court balanced the purposes of the discriminatory

statute22 against its impact on illegitimate children, and found that
"the reach of the statute extends well beyond the asserted purposes."2 3
The fact that the natural father had been judicially determined was in-

consistent with the state claim of necessity for an established "method
of property disposition." 24 The Court felt that a more accurate sys-

tem could be devised to protect against unfounded claims by illegitimate
children. Justice Powell noted the underlying policy rationale against
punishing illegitimate children for the transgressions of their parents. 5

Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's decision has left several
questions unanswered.

Presumably, illegitimate children are still not

a suspect class which requires strict scrutiny; however, Trimble is not
an example of deference to the state legislatures.2 6 Further, the decision does not give states any guidelines for developing a constitutional

intestate statute. The Uniform Probate Code 27 may provide an answer
21. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971), was a five to four decision with
Justices Black, Harlan, Stewart and Blackmun, along with Chief Justice Burger, comprising the majority. Justices Brennan, Douglas, White and Marshall dissented. Trimble v. Gordon, 97 S. Ct. 1459 (1977), was a five to four decision. Justice Powell
delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices Marshall, Brennan, White and
Stevens. Chief Justice Burger, along with Justices Stewart, Blackmun and Rehnquist,
dissented.
22. The major state interests involved were the state's motivation to "encourage
(legitimate) family relationships," In re Estate of Karras, 61 Ill. 2d 40, -, 329 N.E.2d
234, 238 (1975), and the prevention of "spurious claims against an estate." Id. at -,
329 N.E.2d at 240.
23. 97 S. Ct. at 1466 (citing Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 637 (1974)).
24. In Re Estate of Karras, 61 Ill. 2d 40, -, 329 N.E.2d 234, 238 (1975). See
also note 16, supra and accompanying text.
25. Powell stated:
The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages society's condemnation of irresponsible liasons beyond the bonds of marriage. But visiting
this condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust. Moreover,
imposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept
of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual
responsibility or wrong-doing. Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth
and penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffectual-as well as unjust-way
of deterring the parent.
Trimble v. Gordon, 97 S. Ct. 1459, 1465 (1977) (footnote omitted) (quoting from
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)).
26. See A. Bickel, THE LEAsT DANGEROUS BPANcH (1962) for a discussion of the
need for judicial restraint.
27. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-109(2) (1974) provides:
In cases not covered by (1), a person born out of wedlock is a child
of the mother. That person is also a child of the father, if:
(i) the natural parents participated in a marriage ceremony before
or after the birth of the child, even though the attempted marriage is
void; or
(ii) the paternity is established by an adjudication before the death
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for states whose laws are similar to Illinois, even though it discriminates
between different classes of illegitimate children.28 Legislatures will
have to become fully aware that statutes dealing with illegitimacy will
be subjected to a more exacting standard of review. 2 9 For constitutional
scholars, Trimble represents one of the growing number of "middle
ground" equal protection cases.30
Impact of Trimble on Oklahoma

Oklahoma has enacted three statutes dealing with illegitimacy
generally31 and one specifically with the illegitimate child's inheritance
rights." These statutes have, in effect, wiped out the general distincof the father or is established thereafter by clear and convincing proof,
except that the parernity established under this subparagraph (ii) is
ineffective to qualify the father or his kindred to inherit from or through
the child unless the father has openly treated the child as his, and has
not refused to support the child.
(emphasis added).
28. It should be noted that in cases where the natural father is dead, the Uniform
Probate Code allows inheritance only where there is proof of paternity and the father
had openly treated the child as his own. Id. The added criteria of de facto acknowledgement could potentially exclude a class of illegitimate children.
29. See generally Lee, The Changing American Law Relating to Illegitimate Children, 11 WAKE FoREsr L. Rtv. 415 (1975).
30. See, e.g., Note, The Less Restrictive Alternative in ConstitutionalAdjudication:
An Analysis, A Justification, and Some Criteria, 27 VAND. L. REV. 971, 1006 (1974);
Illegitimacy and Equal Protection, supra note 9, at 759.
31. The three amendments to title 10 (Children), in 1974 were:
Reference to "illegitimate" or "bastard" deemed to refer to "child born
out of wedlock": Wherever reference is made in the Oklahoma Statutes to
"illegitimate" or "bastard" it shah be deemed to refer to a "child born out of
wedlock."
After the operaitve date of this act, the term "child born out of wedlock"
shall be used in lieu of the terms "illegitimate" or "bastard."
Act of May 29, 1974 OK.A. Sss. LAws ch. 297, § 7 (codified at OKLA. STAT. tit. 10,
§ 1.1 (Supp. 1977)).
Children deemed legitimate: On and after the date this act becomes operative, all children born within the State of Oklahoma shall be legitimate.
Act of May 29, 1974, 1974 OKLA. Sass. LAws ch. 297, § 8 (operative July 1, 1974)
(codified at OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1.2 (Supp. 1977)).
Use of certain words in reference to children born out of wedlock prohibited:
A. On and after the date upon which this act becomes operative, the designations "illegitimate" or "bastard" shall not be used to designate a child born
out of wedlock. B. No person, firm, corporation, agency, organization, the
State of Oklahoma nor any of its agencies, boards, commission officers or political subdivisions, nor any hospital, nor and institution supported by public
funds, nor any employee of any of the above, shall use the term "illegitimate"
of "bastard" in referring to or designating any child born on or after the operative date of this act.
Act of May 29, 1974, 1974 OKxA. SEss. LAws ch. 297, § 1 (codified at OBIA. STAT.
tit. 10, § 6.5 (Supp. '1977)).
32. The new descent and distribution section became effective October 1, 1977, and
provides:
Inheritance by and from illegitimate child: For inheritance purposes, a child
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tion between legitimate and illegitimate children. However, the legislature appears to have created several different subclasses of illegitimate

children. 83 Oklahoma law is now unclear on whether all children
that have been born in Oklahoma are legitimate, or only those after
July 1, 1974.84

The statute openly discriminates against illegitimate

children born in the other forty-nine states. Oklahoma males could
father children outside the state and possibly avoid the consequences
of their misdeeds. Therefore, possibly two classes of illegitimate children
fall outside the legitimation statute; those born before July 1, 1974,

and those born in another state.
Another unsettled question is whether the amendments of 1974
to title 10 have anything to do with the 1977 amendment dealing with

inheritance by and from illegitimate children. There is a strong likelihood that the new inheritance amendment will be interpreted separately

because it was passed subsequent to the title 10 amendments.8 5 The
new law provides four methods3 6 for an illegitimate child to acquire
the same status as a legitimate child for inheritance purposes.

Three

of the methods involve consent of the natural father, the fourth requires
a paternity proceeding.
If the Trimble case had been brought in Oklahoma at the present
born out of wedlock stands in the same relation to his mother and her kindred,
and she and her kindred to the child, as if that child had been born in wedlock.
For like purposes, every such child stands in identical relation to his father and
his kindred, and the latter and his kindred to the child, whenever: (a) the
father, in writing, signed in the presence of a competent witness acknowledges
himself to be the father of the child, (b) the father and mother intermarried
subsequent to the child's birth, and the father, after such marriage, acknowledged the child as his own or adopted him into his family, (c) the father publicly acknowledged such child as his own, receiving it as such, with the consent
of his wife, if he is married, into his family and otherwise treating it as if it
were a child born in wedlock, or (d) the father was judicially determined to
be such in a paternity proceeding before a court of competent jurisdiction.
For all purposes, the issue of all marriages null in law, or dissolved by
divorce, are deemed to have been born in wedlock.
Act of May 6, 1977, 1977 OKLA. SEss. LAws ch. 36, § 1 (codified at OKLA. STAT. tit.
84, § 215 (Supp. 1977)).
33. The actual intent of tht legislature is unclear. See Aldridge, Illegitimacy and
Legitimation in Oklahoma, in CHIMDREN AND THE LAw 142 (1976).
34. Due to the ambiguous language, see note 31, supra and accompanying text,
there is a real question as to whether the legislature intended the statute to cover all
children or only those after July 1, 1974.
35. OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 215 (Supp. 1977) contains no reference to the legitimation proclamation announced in OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1.2 (Supp. 1977). Without this
specific cross reference, the courts may be forced to deal with it separately.
36. A natural father legitimizes by the following; 1) written acknowledgment; 2)
intermarriage of parents and subsequent acknowledgment; 3) public acknowledgment
plus taking the child into his family; 4) loss in a paternity proceeding. OKI.A. STAT. tit.
84, § 215 (Supp. 1977). See note 32, supra for the full text of the statute.
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time, the plaintiff would have prevailed because the natural father
had been determined through a paternity proceeding. 37 However,
this does not mean the Oklahoma statute is immune from a successful
equal protection challenge. A significant loophole lies in the possibility that a paternity proceeding would not be held before the death
of the natural father. 8 If this situation arose, the illegitimate child
would be unable to gain the same status as a legitimate child.Y0 If
Trimble is construed liberally, Oklahoma may not pass the exacting
standard of the present Supreme Court.
Jay Allen Chaffee
37. See note 16, supra and accompanying text.
38. In Oklahoma, a paternity action cannot be maintained after the death of the
alleged father. Pryor v. Jump, 193 Okla. 560, 83 P.2d 828 (1938).
39. The same problem confronts the Uniform Probate Code even though it allows
some paternity actions after death. See notes 27 and 28, supra and accompanying text.
The question becomes how far will the states have to extend their laws dealing with
intestate succession. Trimble v. Gordon, 97 S. Ct. 1459 (1977), does not reveal if
discrimination between different classes of individual children is constitutional.
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